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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











ANGELA DUNBAR; B. SULLIVAN; D. MRAD; BUREAU OF PRISONS 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-10-cv-02104) 
District Judge:  Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 18, 2012 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit 
 
Judges 








 Ronald Tsosie appeals pro se from a District Court order granting defendants’ 
motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment.  Because the 
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appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
order. 
I. 
 Tsosie, an inmate currently incarcerated at the Special Management Unit of the 
United States Penitentiary at Lewisburg, filed a civil rights complaint against officers of 
the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) in their official and individual capacities.  In his 
complaint, he alleged that the defendants deprived him of his property and mattress for 
fourteen hours and deliberately ignored his medical conditions while he was incarcerated 
at the United States Penitentiary at Canaan (“USP-Canaan”).  Tsosie’s first request for 
appointment of counsel was denied without prejudice, and Tsosie subsequently filed a 
petition for writ of mandamus to have a United States Attorney appointed to represent 
him.  The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss insofar as the 
complaint sought damages from the BOP and the individual defendants in their official 
capacities, finding that these defendants are shielded by sovereign immunity.  The 
District Court then granted summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants in 
their individual capacities, on the ground that Tsosie failed to raise any genuine issues of 
material fact to support his Eighth Amendment claims. 
On appeal, Tsosie raises eleven points, mostly relating to the District Court’s 
treatment of the factual assertions in his opposition to defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment.  He also states that the District Court failed to dispose of his Fifth Amendment 
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procedural due process claim and his petition for a writ of mandamus requesting 
appointment of counsel. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a district 
court’s order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is plenary.  Dique v. 
N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2010).  To survive a motion to dismiss, a 
plaintiff must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  The complaint must contain “factual content that 
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s are] liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 556).  Our review of a district court’s order granting summary judgment is also 
plenary.  Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1250 (3d Cir. 1992).  Summary 
judgment may be granted only where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  We 
will summarily affirm a district court’s order if an appeal presents no substantial 
question.  See
III. 
 I.O.P. 10.6. 
We will summarily affirm the District Court’s order granting the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment.  First, as the 
District Court noted, Tsosie’s claims against the defendants in their official capacities are 
barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  See Becton Dickinson & Co. v. 
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Wolckenhauer, 215 F.3d 340, 345 (3d Cir. 2000) (“It is black letter law that the United 
States cannot be sued without the consent of Congress.”) (internal citation omitted).  
Second, the District Court correctly dismissed Tsosie’s claims for injunctive or 
declaratory relief as moot because he had been transferred from USP-Canaan to another 
facility.  See Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that “the 
district court could not provide [the litigant] with meaningful relief by entering an 
injunctive order respecting the [prison] in which [the litigant] no longer was 
incarcerated.”).  We also agree with the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants in their individual capacities because the evidence on the record 
does not give rise to a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Dunbar or 
Sullivan deliberately delayed Tsosie’s medical treatment for non-medical reasons.  See  
Durmer v. O’Carroll
IV. 
, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[D]eliberate indifference could 
exist in a variety of different circumstances, including where knowledge of the need for 
medical care is accompanied by the intentional refusal to provide that care or where short 
of absolute denial necessary medical treatment is delayed for non-medical reasons, or 
where prison authorities prevent an inmate from receiving recommended treatment.”) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Because Tsosie has raised issues not directly addressed by the District Court’s 
memorandum, we will discuss those briefly here.  Although Tsosie’s complaint did not 
specifically invoke the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, we will nonetheless review 
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the merits of his procedural due process claim because this Court is under an obligation 
to give liberal construction to pro se filings.1  Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 322 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  To establish a claim under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, a 
litigant must show that the government deprived him of a liberty or property interest 
without providing notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.  See Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (“The essence of due process is the requirement that a 
person in jeopardy of serious loss be given notice of the case against him and opportunity 
to meet it.”) (internal citations omitted).  Here, even assuming that Tsosie had a 
constitutionally-protected interest in not having his property temporarily removed from 
his cell, his claim would fail because he has an adequate postdeprivation remedy in state 
tort law.  See Hudson v. Palmer
Lastly, although the District Court did not specifically rule on it, Tsosie’s petition 
for writ of mandamus is also without merit.  A litigant will prevail on a petition for writ 
of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 “only if he has exhausted all other avenues of relief 
and only if the defendant owes him a clear nondiscretionary duty.”  
, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (stating that intentional 
deprivations of property do not violate the Due Process Clause if a meaningful 
postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available). 
Heckler v. Ringer
                                              
1 To the extent that the removal of Tsosie’s property for 14 hours might be defined as a 
search and seizure, we note the settled law that “prisoners have no legitimate expectation 
of privacy and . . . the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches does 
not apply in prison cells . . . .”  Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984). 
, 
466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984).  Here, during the early stages of the litigation, Tsosie filed a 
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motion to appoint counsel under 25 U.S.C. § 175, which provides, “[i]n all States and 
Territories where there are reservations or allotted Indians the United States attorney shall 
represent them in all suits at law and in equity.”  The District Court construed his motion 
as a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), and denied it without prejudice.  Tsosie later 
petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus to compel the United States Attorney’s office 
to represent him pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 175.  However, because 25 U.S.C. § 175 does 
not impose a mandatory duty on the U.S. Attorney’s office, see Siniscal v. United States
Accordingly, this appeal presents us with no substantial question, and we will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  
, 
208 F.2d 406, 410 (9th Cir. 1953), Tsosie was not entitled to mandamus relief. 
See 3rd Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
